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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

Treasury decisions published in this month’s issue of The Journal of
Accountancy have to do with amortization, recovery of taxes by suit,
refund, credit and abatement adjustments, and a rule laid down by Judge
Hand of the United States district court for the southern district of New
York, by the application of which one can determine whether a farm is
operated for pleasure or profit.
The latter decision is readable, if not of the utmost general appeal. A
certain lawyer had owned a farm for many years prior to 1913 and sought
in the years 1913 and 1914 to deduct the losses he sustained in the operation
of it from income derived from other sources on the ground that the farm
represented an enterprise entered into for profit. During the years 1913
and 1914, the operating expenses of the farm exceeded $16,000 in each
year and the gross income $1,100 in one year and $1,600 in the other.
It was shown, however, that in addition to this gross income the “farmer”
had used considerable quantities of the farm products for the sustenance
of his own family. Confronted by this state of affairs the court made the
following rule by which it can be determined whether or not the operation
of a farm can be held to be “an enterprise entered into for profit”:
“In determining whether a farm is run for pleasure or for profit the
relative amount of receipts and expenditures and the expectation of
gain or profit are the controlling factors.”
It is shown in treasury decision No. 3445, that a suit to recover taxes
voluntarily paid without protest cannot be maintained against the collector
of internal revenue but must be brought against the United States. This
decision, together with those having reference to recovery of taxes erro
neously assessed are becoming daily more and more important to taxpayers
as the auditing of returns by the department of internal revenue becomes
more active. As a result of this auditing many taxpayers receive state
ments from the department that an additional tax liability has been found
and is to be assessed against them for prior years, and they are given
thirty days to file an appeal against the assessment and they may have a
conference with the income-tax unit during the said thirty days. If no
appeal is made nor conference had, a claim for abatement will not be
entertained, as the taxpayer has been given opportunity to protest the tax.
After the tax is assessed there are rules showing how and to what extent
the taxpayer may act to effect recovery, and it is important to be well
versed in these matters if one is to obtain a full hearing of his case.
These rulings are sound and made with the view to expediting the work of
the department, but in some cases their strict observance will work a hard
ship upon the taxpayer. The department from time to time modifies these
rulings and it is quite important to keep in touch with its attitude with
reference to this subject. For example, one who seeks to represent a tax
payer at a conference before the treasury department must be enrolled as
attorney or agent in its books; he must show whether or not, and to what
extent, his fee for acting as representative of a taxpayer is contingent upon
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the result of his work, and he must present a power of attorney showing
his right thus to represent his client.
The rule recently issued upon the subject of contingent fees is very
interesting to members of the American Institute of Accountants who have
had opportunities to witness the growing evil of fees for tax services based
upon the success of the “expert” in making a fight for taxes erroneously
assessed. Treasury decisions in this issue bearing upon the subject of
recovery of taxes are 3445, 3450 and 3457.
Paragraph (2) of article 184 of regulations 62 has been amended by
the inclusion of a paragraph as to the valuation of vessels of foreign
ownership for amortization purposes.
TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3444—February 27, 1923)
Income tax—Act of October 3, 1913—Decision of court
1. Deductions—Business Expenses.
Under Section II (B) of the income-tax act of October 3, 1913,
“business expenses” can not be deducted from gross income unless the
enterprise was entered into with the intention of making a gain or profit.
2. Same—Farming Expenses.
In determining whether a farm is run for pleasure or for profit the
relative amount of receipts and expenditures and the expectation of gain
or profit are the controlling factors.
3. Same—Burden of Proof—Evidence.
Where for two years the expenses of a farm were over $16,000 each
year and the income only $1,100 one year and $1,600 the other year, and
there was no evidence of increased income or reduced expenses in other
years, the evidence was held insufficient to sustain the burden of proving
that the farm was being operated as a business for profit.
4. Same—Prior Decisions.
Wilson v. Eisner (282 Fed. 38) and Plant v. Walsh (280 Fed. 722),
distinguished.
The following decision of the United States district court for the
southern district of New York in the case of Archibald G. Thacher, et al.,
executors of the last will and testament of Julien T. Davies, deceased, v.
John Z. Lowe, Jr., former collector of internal revenue, is published for
the information of internal-revenue officers and others concerned.
United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York.
Archibald G. Thacher et al., executors of the last will and testament of
Julien T. Davies, deceased, plaintiff, v. John Z Lowe, Jr., ex-collector
of internal revenue, defendant.
[November 22,1922]
OPINION OF THE COURT

L. Hand, Judge: The question in this case is a narrow one, and is
merely whether the farm which Mr. Davies operated during his lifetime
at his residence on Long Island was a “lawful business carried on for
gain or profit.” I have no doubt that a lawyer can operate a farm for
profit. However unlikely it may be that he will succeed in the enterprise,
the enterprise may, in fact, be intended as a business. But it is equally
clear that a lawyer may run a farm merely as an adjunct to his country
place, and between the two the test appears to me to be only of his actual
intention. Moreover, in ascertaining that intention I can see no escape
from making the crux of the determination his receipts and expenditures.
In this case we have only the evidence of two years, during each of
which the expenses of the farm were over $16,000, while there was an
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income in one year of only $1,100 and in another of $1,600. That is all
we have to go on, and it is quite evident that in those two years not only
was there no profit, but there was a very heavy loss. There is no sugges
tion that at any previous time Mr. Davies had made any money out of the
farm. He lived off it in part, he and his family, by getting his supplies
from it, and that is properly to be considered as a part of his profits. Still
there is no evidence of the value of those supplies or that added to his
returns they made the venture profitable. The plaintiff has the burden,
and it is difficult to imagine how a farm which has been running the
number of years which this had could be thought capable of turning a
deficiency of 90 per cent. into a profit.
This is a different case from Wilson v. Eisner. There Mr. Wilson ran
a racing stable in Kentucky and he made money on it for about a third
of the time, though for two-thirds of the time he lost. The circuit court
of appeals said that as he had sworn that he was running it as a business
and in the hope of making money, the judge ought to have believed him
and ought to have directed a verdict for him, corroborated as he was by
the evidence of past years. In Plant v. Walsh, Judge Thomas thought
that Mr. Plant’s farm, which was very like this farm, was a business.
First, it appeared affirmatively that Mr. Plant had just begun the farm,
and although it had not yet begun to be profitable he said that he expected
to make it so. Hence, Judge Thomas thought that he was already con
ducting it for “gain or profit.” But the learned judge went on to say
obiter in addition that he did not think because the farm was conducted
only for the pleasure of the owner and as a part of his testate as a
country gentleman it was any less a business.
With the utmost deference I can not altogether agree with that state
ment. It does seem to me that if a man does not expect to make any gain
or profit out of the management of the farm, it can not be said to be
a business for profit, and while I should be the last to say that the
making of a profit was not in itself a pleasure, I hope I should also be
one of those who agree there were other pleasures than making a profit.
Indeed it makes no difference whether a man is engaged in a business
which gives him pleasure, if it be a business; that is irrelevant, as was
said in Wilson v. Eisner. But it does make a difference whether the
occupation which gives him pleasure can honestly be said to be carried
on for profit. Unless you can find that element it is not within the
statute, and I can not see in this case even the first intimation of a reason
to suppose that Mr. Davies in his lifetime carried on this farm with the
hope of a profit, or that if he had not got anything else out of it except
the money which he did get he would have kept on.
I will therefore direct a verdict for the defendant.
(Pursuant to the direction the jury returned a verdict in favor of
the defendant.)
(T. D. 3445—February 27, 1923)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court
1. Voluntary Payment—Protest—Recovery of Taxes by Suit.
A suit against a collector of internal revenue to recover taxes paid
voluntarily and without protest can not be maintained.
2. Same—Section 252, Revenue Act of 1918.
Section 252 does not give a right of action against the collector nor
eliminate the necessity for payment of taxes under protest as a prerequi
site to suit.
3. Section 252, Revenue Act of 1918, Construed.
Section 252 of the revenue act of 1918 is intended to give the com
missioner power to credit or refund overpayments of taxes where no
claim for refund is filed by the taxpayer and was enacted to permit the
commissioner, of his own volition, upon discovery of any overpayment, to
credit or refund the same notwithstanding the provisions of section 3228,
Revised Statutes.
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4. Judgment Affirmed.
The judgment of the United States district court (280 Fed. 413, T. D.
3308) is affirmed.
The following decision of the United States circuit court of appeals,
second circuit, affirming the judgment of the United States district court
for the southern district of New York in the case of Benjamin Fox v.
William H. Edwards, collector (T. D. 3308), is published for the infor
mation of internal-revenue officers and others concerned.
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Benjamin Fox, plaintiff in error, v. William H. Edwards, defendant in error.
Writ of error to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York.
Before Rogers, Hough, and Manton, Circuit Judges.
Rogers, Circuit Judge: The plaintiff commenced this action against
the defendant, at the time involved collector of internal revenue for the
second district of New York, to recover the sum of $1,279.79.
The complaint alleges that on March 15, 1919, plaintiff filed with
defendant, who was then collector of internal revenue, a return of his net
income for the calendar year 1918, showing a net income of $25,919.35,
and on the 15th days of the months of March, June, September, and
December of the year 1919 paid to defendant in quarterly installments the
sum of $3,910.08 as and for a tax upon his net income for the year 1918,
which tax had been computed by plaintiff and appeared by the return to
be due. In computing his net income for 1918 plaintiff alleges that he
failed to deduct an alleged loss of $15,283.33 sustained in that year. Con
sequently, on March 15, 1921, two years after the filing of the original
return, plaintiff filed with defendant an amended return for the year
1918 showing a net income of $10,636.02 and a total tax liability of only
$907.76. Demand was then made upon defendant for the sum of $3,002.32
and a claim for refund of the same filed with the commissioner of internal
revenue.
The plaintiff, apparently without waiting for action by the commis
sioner, applied the sum of $1,722.53 by claim of credit against his income
tax for the year 1920, and no action having been taken by the commis
sioner of internal revenue within six months on the claim for refund,
brought suit against defendant in error to recover the balance.
To the complaint setting forth these facts defendant demurred upon
the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. The ground of the demurrer was that plaintiff having paid his
tax voluntarily and without protest, showed no right to recover the same
in a suit against defendant personally.
The court below sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint
upon the merits. The only question presented is: May a taxpayer who
pays his tax voluntarily and without protest based upon figures for which
he alone is responsible, but who subsequently discovers that he has made
a mistake, bring an action against the collector who received his voluntary
payment, to recover the amount of the alleged overpayment, where such
overpayment was due not to any action on the part of the collector or of
any other taxing official but solely to the taxpayer’s own error.
The plaintiff relies on section 252 of the revenue act of 1918, which
reads as follows:
Sec. 252. That if, upon examination of any return of income
made pursuant to this act, the act of August 5, 1919, entitled “An
act to provide revenue, equalize duties, and encourage the industries
of the United States, and for other purposes,” the act of October 3,
1913, entitled “An act to reduce tariff duties and to provide revenue
for the government, and for other purposes,” the revenue act of 1916,
as amended, or the revenue act of 1917, it appears that an amount of
income, war-profits, or excess-profits tax has been paid in excess of
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that properly due, then, notwithstanding the provisions of section
3228 of the revised statutes, the amount of the excess shall be credited
against any income, war-profits, or excess-profits taxes, or installment
thereof, then due from the taxpayer under any other return, and any
balance of such excess shall be immediately refunded to the taxpayer:
Provided, That no such credit or refund shall be allowed or made
after five years from the date when the return was due, unless before
the expiration of such five years a claim therefor is filed by the
taxpayer.
The Supreme Court in the City of Philadelphia v. the Collector
(5 Wall. 720) had under consideration the right to recover back money
paid for taxes. The plaintiffs had sued to recover the sum of $26,875.57
which they had paid under protest and which the collector had demanded
of them as for internal revenue duties. The court, while it recognized
the right to recover in an action at law in a proper case money illegally
exacted for taxes, said:
Appropriate remedy to recover back money paid under protest on
account of duties or taxes erroneously or illegally assessed is an action
of assumpsit for money had and received. Where the party volun
tarily pays the money he is without remedy, but if he pays it by
compulsion of law or under protest, or with notice that he intends
to bring suit to test the validity of the claim, he may recover it back,
if the assessment was erroneous or illegal, in the action of assumpsit
for money had and received.
When a party, knowing his rights, voluntarily pays duties or
taxes illegally or erroneously assessed, the law will not afford him
redress for the injury; but when the duties or taxes are illegally de
manded, and he pays the same under protest or gives notice to the
collector that he intends to bring a suit against him to test the validity
of the claim, the collector may be compelled to refund the amount
illegally exacted.
The principle that taxes voluntarily paid can not be recovered back
is thoroughly established. It has been so declared in the following cases
in the supreme court: United States v. New York & Cuba Mail Steam
ship Co. (200 U. S. 488, 493, 494) ; Chesebrough v. United States (192
U. S. 253) ; Little v. Bowers (134 U. S. 547, 554) ; Wright v. Blakeslee
(101 U. S. 174, 178) ; Railroad Co. v. Commissioners (98 U. S. 541, 543) ;
Lamborn v. County Commissioners (97 U. S. 181) ; Elliott v. Swartwout
(10 Pet. 137). And there are numerous like cases in other federal courts:
Procter & Gamble Co. v. United States (281 Fed. 1014) ; Vaughan v.
Riordan (280 Fed. 742, 745) ; Beer v. Moffatt (192 Fed. 984, affirmed 209
Fed. 779) ; Newhall v. Jordan (160 Fed. 661) ; Christie Street Commis
sion Co. v. United States (126 Fed. 991) ; Kentucky Bank v. Stone (88
Fed. 383) ; Corkle v. Maxwell (7 Fed. Cas. 3231).
And the rule of the federal courts is not at all peculiar to them. It
is the settled general rule of the state courts as well that no matter what
may be the ground of the objection to the tax or assessment if it has been
paid voluntarily and without compulsion it can not be recovered back in
an action at law, unless there is some constitutional or statutory provision
which gives to one so paying such a right notwithstanding the payment
was made without compulsion: Adams v. New Bedford (155 Mass. 317) ;
McCue v. Monroe County (162 N. Y. 235) Taylor v. Philadelphia Board
of Health (31 P. St. 73) ; Williams v. Merritt (152 Mich. 621) ; Gould v.
Hennepin County (76 Minn. 379) ; Martin v. Kearney County (62 Minn.
538) ; Gar v. Hurd (92 Ills. 315) ; Slimmer v. Chickasaw County (140
Iowa, 448) ; Warren v. San Francisco (150 Calif. 167) ; State v. Chicago
& C. R. Co. (165 No. 597).
And it has been many times held, in the absence of a statute on this
subject, that mere payment under protest does not save a payment from
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being voluntary, in the sense which forbids a recovery back of the
tax paid, if it was not made, under any duress, compulsion, or threats,
or under the pressure of process immediately available for the forcible
collection of the tax.—Dexter v. Boston (176 Mass. 247) ; Flower v. Lance
(59 N. Y. 603) ; Williams v. Merritt (152 Mich. 621) ; Oakland Cemetery
Association v. Ramsey County (98 Minn. 404) ; Robins v. Latham (134
No. 466) ; Whitbeck v. Minch (48 Ohio St. 210) ; Peebles v. Pittsburgh
(101 Pa. St. 304) ; Montgomery v. Cowlitz County (14 Wash. 230) ; Cin
cinnati & C. R. Co. v. Hamilton County (120 Tenn. 1).
The principle that a tax or an assessment voluntarily paid can not be
recovered back is an ancient one in the common law and is of general
application. See Cooley on Taxation (vol. 2, 3d ed. p. 1495). That
eminent authority also points out that every man is supposed to know the
law, and if he voluntarily makes a payment which the law would not
compel him to make he can not afterwards assign his ignorance of the law
as a reason why the state should furnish him with legal remedies to
recover it back. And he adds:
Especially is this the case when the officer receiving the money,
who is chargeable with no more knowledge of the law than the party
making payment, is not put on his guard by any warning or protest,
and the money is paid over to the use of the public in apparent
acquiescence in the justice of the exaction. Mistake of fact can
scarcely exist in such a case except in connection with negligence;
as the illegalities which render such a demand a nullity must appear
from the records, and the taxpayer is just as much bound to inform
himself what the records show or do not show, as are the public
authorities. The rule of law is a rule of sound public policy also; it
is a rule of quiet as well as of good faith, and precludes the courts
being occupied in undoing the arrangements of parties which they
have voluntarily made, and into which they have not been drawn by
fraud or accident, or by any excusable ignorance of their legal rights
and liabilities.
But the question presented must be decided upon the language of
section 252 hereinbefore set forth in this opinion. In the cases within
the purview of the section the right of the taxpayer to so much of the
tax as he has paid in excess of that properly due is not made to depend
upon whether it was paid under protest. The nature of the section must
be regarded, as in the case of the statute before the court in United
States v. Hvoslef (237 U. S. 1, 12), and so regarded it negatives any
intent that a protest should be necessary. In this case as in that the right
of repayment is established by the express terms of the statute itself.
The section is intended to give the commissioner of internal revenue
power to credit or refund overpayments when no claim for a refund is
filed by the taxpayer. Prior to that enactment the commissioner had no
authority to credit or refund overpayments of taxes unless appeal was
duly made to him in the manner prescribed by section 3220 of the revised
statutes.
Section 252 of the act of 1928 has nothing whatever to do with the
collector of internal revenue or with an action against him. The power
or duty to make refunds under the section is vested not in the collector
but in the commissioner of internal revenue. The commissioner, prior to
the enactment of section 252, had no authority to credit or refund over
payments of taxes unless appeal was duly made to him in the manner
prescribed by section 3220 of the revised statutes, which read: “The com
missioner of internal revenue * * * is authorized, on appeal to him made,
to remit, refund, and pay back all taxes erroneously or illegally assessed
or collected * *
And the appeal had to be made within two years
after the cause of action accrued, as required by section 3228.
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That being the condition of the law congress enacted section 252 of
the act of 1918. The primary purpose of that enactment was to permit
the commissioner of his own volition upon discovery of any overpayment
to credit or refund the same notwithstanding the provisions of section 3228
of the revised statutes, and to limit the time within which he could make
such credit or refund to “five years from the date the return was made.”
The section does not in express terms purport to give the taxpayer a
right to sue for the recovery of the excess in the tax paid. It simply
defines the powers and duties of the commissioner in correcting over
payments which he finds have been made. It was intended to protect the
commissioner in making refunds which ought to be made even though
no claim for refund was filed, or though the two-year period for filing
claims prescribed by section 3228 had expired.
Taxes erroneously paid or illegally exacted may be recovered—
1. From the commissioner of internal revenue under section 3220 of
the revised statutes heretofore referred to.
2. Through an action at law brought against the United States. This
is by virtue of the so-called Tucker act (Judicial Code, sec. 24, par. 20,
ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635) being held that a suit may be maintained directly
against the United States for the recovery of taxes wrongfully assessed
and collected.—Emery, Bird, Thayer, Realty Co. v. United States (198
Fed. 242, 249); Christie Street Commission Co. v. United States (136
Fed. 326).
3. Through an action ag
ainst a collector who wrongfully exacted the
tax and who may be sued for such money as he is not entitled to retain.—
Smietanka v. Indiana Steel Co. (257 U. S. 1) ; Sage v. United States (250
U. S. 33).
But in Elliott v. Swartwout (10 Pet. 137), the court held that the
collector was not liable in an action to recover the excess duties mistakenly
collected unless protest was made at the time of payment or notice was
given to him not to pay the money over to the treasury. The principle
applied was the one applied to agents in private transactions—that a
voluntary payment to an agent without notice of objection would not
subject the agent to liability he having paid it over to his principal, but
that payment with notice or with a protest might make the agent liable
if in despite of the notice or protest he paid the money over to his prin
cipal. But after an act of congress required collectors to pay over such
moneys it was held that the personal liability was gone.—Cary v. Curtis
(3 How. 236). But later statutes, as pointed out in Smietanka v. Indiana
Steel Co., supra, recognize suits against collectors in such cases.
In our opinion section 252 of the act of 1918 was apparently designed
to counteract the effect of section 3228 of the revised statutes which
limited refunds to a period of two years after the tax had been paid, and
it relates to the matter of obtaining a credit or a refund from the com
missioner. If it impliedly gives a cause of action, about which we are
not now called upon to express an opinion, it is a cause of action against
the United States. It does not confer a right to bring an action against
the collector in cases in which no liability otherwise existed.
Judgment affirmed.
(T. D. 3448—March 5, 1923)
Income tax—Amortization allowance
Computation of replacement cost of foreign-owned vessels for amorti
zation purposes.
Paragraph (2) of article 184 of regulations No. 62 is hereby amended
to read as follows:
In the case of property not included in (1) above, the value shall be
the estimated value to the taxpayer in terms of its actual use or employ
ment in his going business, such value to be not less than the sale or
salvage value of the property and not greater than the estimated cost of
replacement under normal post-war conditions less depreciation and
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depletion. Upon the basis of the costs prevailing at the latest pre-war
date at which a reasonably normal market existed the commissioner shall
in respect of basic material and labor costs determine and publish ratios
of estimated post-war costs of replacement, and a taxpayer shall use such
ratios in computing a claim for a tentative allowance for amortization.
Such tentative allowance may be redetermined on or before March 3,
1924, at the request of the taxpayer or by the commissioner.
However, as to a vessel of a foreign corporation, a foreign partner
ship, or a non-resident alien, the estimated replacement cost under normal
post-war conditions shall be the fair average cost in the country in which
owned, of a vessel of similar size, type, speed and equipment for the
period beginning March 3, 1921, and extending to March 3, 1924, costs
for the unexpired portion of this period to be estimated as nearly as
practicable.
Special record of all property falling in (1) above, must be preserved
by the taxpayer, and the commissioner must be notified with the next
tax return (a) if, after having been in good faith permanently discarded
or dismantled, property shall in any case be restored to use because of
conditions not foreseen or anticipated at the time it was discarded; or (b)
of the selling price, if sold.
(T. D. 3450—March 13, 1923)
Income tax—Refund, credit, and abatement adjustments
Section 252, revenue act of 1921—Article 1031 (a), Regulations
No. 62, amended.
Article 1031 (a), regulations No. 62, is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Refund, credit, and abatement adjustments.—Reduction of internal
revenue assessments and adjustments of overpayments of revenues will
be accomplished in one of three ways:
(a) On the basis of an application submitted by a taxpayer on form
843, together with appropriate supporting evidence to be filed in the office
of the collector of internal revenue of the district in which the tax is
assessed.
(b) On the basis of a certificate of overassessment prepared by the
appropriate administrative unit in the bureau in each case in which an
overassessment of tax is disclosed through the audit of a return.
(c) On the basis of a blanket claim, a schedule of taxes found to
be uncollectible, or a schedule of duplicate payments and overpayments
due to obvious error on all forms of taxable returns submitted by a
collector of internal revenue.
In cases covered by (b) the taxpayer need not file a claim. Proper
adjustment will be made in the bureau and notice thereof forwarded to the
taxpayer. However, after the expiration of five years from the date when
any return was due no adjustment of overpayments may be made by the
bureau unless a claim for refund or credit has been filed within the time
prescribed by law, except in cases where invested capital is decreased by
the commissioner due to the fact that the taxpayer failed to take adequate
deductions in previous years. See section 252 of the statute and article
1037.
(T. D. 3457—March 17, 1923)
Refunds and credits
Section 252 of the revenue act of 1921 was amended by an act
approved March 4, 1923 (Pub. 527), effective as of the date of its approval,
to read as follows (the portion added by the amendment is underscored) :
(a) That if, upon examination of any return of income made pur
suant to this act, the act of August 5, 1909, entitled “An act to provide
revenue, equalize duties, and encourage the industries of the United States,
and for other purposes,” the act of October 3, 1913, entitled “An act to
reduce tariff duties and to provide revenue for the government, and for
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other purposes,” the revenue act of 1916, as amended, the revenue act of
1917, or the revenue act of 1918, it appears that an amount of income,
war-profits or excess-profits tax has been paid in excess of that properly
due, then, notwithstanding the provisions of section 3228 of the revised
statutes, the amount of the excess shall be credited against any income,
war-profits or excess-profits taxes, or installment thereof, then due from
the taxpayer under any other return, and any balance of such excess shall
be immediately refunded to the taxpayer; Provided, That no such credit
or refund shall be allowed or made after five years from the date when
the return was due, unless before the expiration of such five years a claim
therefor is filed by the taxpayer, or unless before the expiration of two
years from the time the tax was paid a claim therefor is filed by the
taxpayer: Provided, further, That if the taxpayer has, within five years
from the time the return for the taxable year 1917 was due, filed a
waiver of his right to have the taxes due for such taxable year determined
and assessed within five years after the return was filed, such credit or
refund shall be allowed or made if claim therefor is filed either within
six years from the time the return for such (taxable year 1917 was due or
within two years from the time the tax was paid: Provided further,
That if upon examination of any return of income made pursuant to the
revenue act of 1917, the revenue act of 1918, or this act, the invested capital
of a taxpayer is decreased by the commissioner, and such decrease is due
to the fact that the taxpayer failed to take adequate deductions in previous
years, with the result that an amount of income tax in excess of that
properly due was paid in any previous year or years, then, notwithstanding
any other provision of law and regardless of the expiration of such fiveyear period, the amount of such excess shall, without the filing of any
claim therefor, be credited or refunded as provided in this section: And
provided further, That nothing in this section shall be construed to bar
from allowance claims for refund filed prior to the passage of the revenue
act of 1918 under subdivision (a) of section 14 of the revenue act of 1916,
or filed prior to the passage of this act under section 252 of the revenue
act of 1918.
(b) Where a tax has been paid under the provisions of section 221
or 237 in excess of that properly due, any refund or credit made under
the provisions of this section, or section 3228 of the revised statutes shall
be made to the withholding agent unless the amount of such tax was
actually withheld by the withholding agent.
Until March 4, 1923, the effective date of this amendment to section
252, a claim for refund or credit of an amount of income, war-profits
or excess-profits taxes, erroneously or illegally collected, could be allowed
after five years from the date when the return was due, even though such
claim was not filed by the taxpayer until after the expiration of the five
years, if such claim was presented to the commissioner of internal revenue
within four years next after payment of the tax. (T. D. 3416.) After
March 4, 1923, however, the effective date of the above amendment to
section 252, a claim for credit or refund may be allowed or made after
five years from the date when the return was due only in those cases where
before the expiration of such five years a claim therefor is filed by the
taxpayer, or where before the expiration of two years from the time the
tax was paid a claim therefor is filed by the taxpayer.
In those cases, however, where the taxpayer has, within five years
from the time the return for the taxable year 1917 was due, filed a waiver
of his right to have the tax due for such taxable year determined and
assessed within five years after the return was filed, a claim for credit or
refund may be allowed or made after five years from the date when the
return was due if claim therefor is filed either within six years from the
time the return for the taxable year 1917 was due or within two years
from the time the tax was paid. The effect of this amendment is to grant
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to those taxpayers who, prior to the expiration of the period within which
an additional assessment could be made, filed a waiver for the year 1917,
an additional year in which to present their claims for refund or credit
of the excessive tax paid for the year 1917, with the result that in such
cases the claim may be entertained if filed either within six years after
the return was due or within two years from the time the tax was paid.
The statute provides for the extension of the period within which a claim
may be filed in cases where the taxpayer has filed a waiver of his right
to have the taxes due for the taxable year 1917 determined and assessed
within five years after the return was filed, and the waiver provided for
therein does not involve the consent in writing, provided for in section
250(d) of both the commissioner of internal revenue and the taxpayer to
a determination, assessment, and collection of the tax at a time later than
five years from the time the return was filed. Consequently, the accept
ance by the commissioner of a waiver filed by a taxpayer within five years
from the time the return for the taxable year 1917 was due, is not
necessary in order to bring the case under the second proviso of section
252, as amended, and to extend the period within which a claim for refund
may be filed to six years from the time the return for such year was due.
The act further amends section 252 to provide that where a tax has
been paid by a withholding agent in excess of that properly due, the
refund or credit of such excess amount shall be made to the withholding
agent, unless the amount of such tax was actually withheld by the with
holding agent.
Section 3226 of the revised statutes was amended by an act approved
March 4, 1923 (Pub. 527), effective as of the date of its approval, to read
as follows (the portion added by the amendment is underscored) :
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the
recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously
or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have
been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been
excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for
refund or credit has been duly filed with the commissioner of internal
revenue, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the
regulations of the secretary of the treasury established in pursuance
thereof. No such suit or proceeding shall be begun before the
expiration of six months from the date of filing such claim unless the
commissioner renders a decision thereon within that time, nor after
the expiration of five years from the date of the payment of such tax,
penalty, or sum, unless such suit or proceeding is begun within two years
after the disallowance of the part of such claim to which such suit or
proceeding relates. The commissioner shall within 90 days after any
such disallowance notify the taxpayer thereof by mail.
This amendment of section 3226 allows the bringing of a suit or pro
ceeding for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected within two years after the
disallowance of the part of a claim for refund or credit to which such
suit or proceeding relates, even though such suit is not brought within
five years from the date of the payment of the tax. The statute requires
that the commissioner shall notify the taxpayer by mail of the disallowance
of a claim for refund or credit within ninety days after such disallowance.
Regulations No. 62 will be amended to make the changes necessitated
by the amendments to section 252 of the revenue act of 1921 and section
3226 of the revised statutes.
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